Tagged: Supreme Court

Minorities suffer as the Supreme Court supports ‘suspicionless’ stop searches

In a recent decision the Supreme Court has ruled that Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (‘s.60’) authorising ‘suspicionless’ stop searches, does not constitute a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) regarding respect for private and family life. This decision has attracted much criticism and a close examination of it raises serious concerns vis-à-vis the soundness of its legal analysis, its accordance with established Strasbourg jurisprudence and its regard for key statistical information relating to the use of stop and search powers. Ultimately, the judgment reaches an errant conclusion with potentially damaging implications for the already fragile relationship between ethnic minorities and the police in the United Kingdom.

The facts

The Appellant in this case was a 37 year old Afro-Caribbean woman named Juliette Roberts. Ms. Roberts worked in a school helping young children with disabilities and had no previous cautions or criminal convictions of any kind. In 2010, Ms. Roberts boarded a bus in her local borough of Haringey, North London and following the discovery that she had insufficient funds on her Oyster card and no money with which to pay for her journey, transport police officers were called to the scene. Upon arrival, the police elected to search Mrs. Roberts under s.60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. S.60 grants police powers of stop and search ‘in anticipation of violence’ and specifically authorises a police officer to stop and search any person or vehicle within a designated area for offensive weapons or instruments within a limited time period. S.60 does not require a police officer to have any reasonable suspicion prior to carrying out a search and only requires that they have the authorisation to do so from an officer of at least the rank of inspector. As Ms. Roberts worked in a school, she was concerned that some of the young people she worked with might see her being searched and so asked to be searched at a police station instead of in public. The police officers refused her request and she was restrained, handcuffed and her body and property were forcibly searched.

After her claims in the Divisional Court and Court of Appeal failed, Ms. Roberts appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that s.60 was contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR regarding the right to respect for private and family life. Specifically, Ms. Roberts argued that s.60 conferred on overly-broad power on the police and thus was not ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by Article 8(2) ECHR.

Decision

In a unanimous decision, The Supreme Court accepted that suspicionless stop searches infringe upon the right to respect for private life, however, they argued that they are in ‘accordance with the law’, in addition to pursuing a legitimate aim and being necessary in a democratic society as required by article 8(2) ECHR. Central to the judges’ decision were what they considered to be the numerous ‘safeguards’ in place to constrain the exercise of the broad power conferred upon police officers. The judges drew particular attention in this regard to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1985 (PACE) which govern the steps an officer must take before they begin a search, such as telling a person their name and the object of the search and also to parts of the police Standard Operating Procedures which contain reference to the Race Relations Act 2000 which prohibits racial discrimination in the exercise of police powers. The judges also highlighted the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (‘BUSS’) which largely deals with authorisations given by a higher ranking officer before individual officers are allowed to use s.60 stop searches and requirements for data collection regarding the use of the power.The Court reasoned that as failure to follow these safeguards could render a stop and search unlawful and therefore expose an officer to disciplinary action or Civil proceedings, they were sufficient constraints on the use of the s.60 power.

The judges also held that the powers were of ‘great benefit’ to the public and that their unpredictability was critical to their deterrent effect. Finally, the judges’ reasoned that although there was concern that black and minority ethnic people were being disproportionately targeted with the s.60 power, black and minority ethnic people would most benefit from the reduction in violence that would result from the use of such powers as many gang members were from these ethnic groups.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Discussion

Several aspects of this decision are deserving of criticism and the first is the Court’s assessment of the purported ‘safeguards’ on the exercise of the s.60 stop and search power. In Gillan and Quinton v UK the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) had to consider a similar power of suspicionless stop and search under the now defunct s.44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In finding that s.44 constituted a violation of Article 8, the ECtHR explicitly rejected the argument that the PACE Codes of Practice were a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary searches. The Court accepted that an officer carrying out a stop and search was bound to comply with the Codes, however, it determined that they governed only ‘the mode in which the stop and search is carried out’ as opposed to providing any real constraints on and individual officer’s ‘decision to stop and search’. From an analysis of the the BUSS scheme it is clear that this also places no additional restrictions on an individual officer’s decision to carry out a suspicionless stop and search and focuses only on the prior authorisation. The Court’s argument that the Standard Operating Procedures constitute a safeguard as they contain provisions on the Race Relations Act which if breached could expose an officer to legal or disciplinary proceedings is similarly unpersuasive. In Gillan, an almost identical argument was put forward by the Government, however, this was dismissed by the Court on the basis that “in the absence of any obligation on the part of the officer to show a reasonable suspicion, it is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the power was improperly exercised.”

The judges’ subsequent remarks about the ‘great benefits to the public’ which stem from s.60 stop searches are also deserving of criticism. Figures taken from the Ministry of Justice 2010 report on Race and the Criminal Justice System show that out of the 118,119 s.60 stop searches carried out by police in 2009/2010, only 2% resulted in an arrest. It is difficult to see how a power with such a miniscule arrest rate can be said to be greatly beneficial to the public and it is obvious that its ‘unpredictability’ has done little to improve its efficacy. With this is mind, the judges’ suggestion that these benefits could in some way justify discriminatory searches is indefensible. Several reports have pointed to the astonishing race disproportionately in the use of the s.60 power, with one study by the Equality and Human Rights Commission indicating that in 2011/12 black people were 28 times more likely to be stopped and searched under s.60 than white people. This disproportionality, coupled with the bewilderingly low arrest rate, suggests grave prejudice in the use of s.60 by the police and it is difficult to see how the Court can seek to justify this on any grounds. The Court’s argument that even if discrimination is a problem, as many of these gangs are ‘largely composed of young people from black and minority ethnic groups…it is members of these groups who will benefit most from the reduction in violence” is specious. Firstly, the premise is highly debateable; there is no universal consensus as to exactly what constitutes a ‘gang’ and many commentators have suggested that the term is disproportionately applied to groups of young black males. Thus in a nation where groups of disaffected white youths almost necessarily outnumber similar groups of black youths, they avoid this type of predatory categorisation and acknowledgement in mainstream discourse. Next, the notion that s.60 has a serious effect on the level of youth violence is also highly debateable. Tellingly, the judges adduce no references to support this assertion, however, common sense dictates that if the arrest rate for s.60 is so low, it is unlikely that it can be having a profound effect on levels of youth violence. What is most concerning about this passage however, is the suggestion that as some young people from black and minority ethnic communities are involved in violent crime, it is somehow justifiable to treat all young black people as potential suspects. Not only would such racial profiling be manifestly unlawful under the same PACE Codes and Race Relations Act that the judges had earlier lauded, but this reasoning has the effect of reinforcing harmful and pernicious stereotypes of young black people as potential criminals, conveniently paying no attention to the overwhelming body of evidence which suggests that they are also far more likely to be the victims of violent crime than any other race.

 

A close analysis of the Roberts judgement reveals that it reaches a wholly unsatisfactory conclusion. In their analysis, the Supreme Court essentially disregard the criticisms and concerns expressed by the Strasbourg Court in Gillan and reach a decision as to the compliance of s.60 with the ECHR which is seemingly devoid of any appreciation of the many reports and statistics related to the futility and racially disproportionate use of the power . It is perhaps no surprise that after stinging criticism by the Home Secretary regarding the discriminatory and unlawful application of s.60, its usage has dropped dramatically in recent years. Nevertheless, the Court’s holding of it as compliant with Article 8 ECHR and attempts to justify its discriminatory application risk reviving its usage and exacerbating tensions between the police and ethnic minority communities who see it as a tool of racial oppression.

 

 

 

 

 

In Re South Africa Apartheid Litigation: Corporate Complicity in Apartheid Atrocities

           Background

The claims In Re South Africa Apartheid litigation arose in 2002 following the alleged involvement of 5 major multinational corporations in gross Human Rights violations during the Apartheid era in South Africa. Mr Ntsebeza, a black South African national, along with a host of other claimants brought a class-action lawsuit in the United States alleging that Ford, Barclays, IBM, General Motors and German automotive manufacturer Daimler GM not only knowingly conducted business in South Africa during the apartheid regime, but worse, that they provided direct assistance to and acted in accordance with the South African government and security forces during their brutal oppression of blacks and other minorities over the course of Apartheid.

cuanavale

The claimants alleged that Ford, General Motors and Daimler GM manufactured vehicles which were used by the South African security forces to violently suppress opposition to apartheid and inflict wide spread atrocities amongst the black civilian population. These companies, who owned a multitude of factories and plants in South Africa during Apartheid, were also accused of callously retaliating against employees who were found to be participating in the anti-apartheid movement, through such means as, unfair dismissals, intimidation and even assisting with unlawful detentions and torture in collaboration with the apartheid authorities. The corporations were also accused of providing de facto support to the apartheid regime by implementing segregation within their own facilities and grossly underpaying blacks for equal work. 

IBM were accused of actively assisting the Apartheid state by producing race-based identification documents  which were used by the authorities to greatly restrict the movement of blacks around South Africa. These documents also allowed the authorities to implement a meticulous geographic separation of the races, whereby blacks were forced into remote and dilapidated shanty towns known as ‘Bantustans’ and obligated to live there as ‘Bantus’ deprived entirely of South African nationality and any of the corresponding rights of such citizenship. 

Barclays

Barclays were accused of participating and assisting in the geographic separation of the races by refusing black employees the opportunity to work in, or be transferred to branches in predominantly white areas. This practice was not mandatory under South African law at the time and thus Barclays were accused, of providing de facto support to the apartheid regime through the implementation of such policies. 

The Defendant companies rejected the legal culpability for their actions but never denied their involvement in apartheid in the ways advanced by the claimants.

Claims in United States

As the Republic of South Africa was originally opposed to the litigation, the claimants elected to bring their action in the United States, alleging that the corporations concerned had all aided and abetted gross human rights violations, which was an actionable offence under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) . The ATS is an old piece of US legislation which grants United States courts original jurisdiction over  ‘any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States‘. In other words, the ATS potentially allows for a foreign claimant (a non-national and non-resident of the US) to sue a foreign defendant (also a non-national and non-resident of the US) in a United States court for gross Human Rights violations, irrespective of where these violations occurred. The ATS has been instrumental in allowing many individuals whose human rights have been violated but whom, for a variety of reasons, were not able to obtain any redress in the place where these abuses occurred, to recover damages by bringing claims in the United States.

Supreme_Court_US_2009The District Court dismissed the claims in 2004, holding that aiding and abetting was not a viable cause of action under the ATS. In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court, holding that aiding and abetting was actionable under the ATS and remanded the case back to the District Court for further hearing. The defendant companies then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, asking the Court to rule definitively on the issue. 

Lack of Quorum in the Supreme Court

In an extraordinary turn of events, the Supreme Court declared that it would not be able to hear the appeal, due to the fact that 4 of the 9 Justices on the Court had to withdraw from proceedings based on their financial and personal interests in the companies involved. The Court thus lacked the required Quorum (6 Justices) it needed to hear a case and was subsequently forced to affirm the ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal without declaring it binding precedent.  The claims against the corporations were thus able to proceed.

Impact of Kiobel v Shell

On 17 April 2013 the Supreme Court handed down its judgement in the eagerly anticipated case of Kiobel v Shell.  This was a case concerning a number of Nigerian nationals, who were suing the Anglo-Dutch company Shell for its alleged complicity in torture, rape and the extra-judicial killing of activists in the Ogoni region of Nigeria. The claimants could not bring the claims in Nigeria, because they feared reprisals from powerful elements within the Nigerian Government and military, who they claim had been heavily involved in the abuses. For this reason they too, like the claimants in the In Re Apartheid cases, sought to rely on the ATS to bring their claims against Shell in the United States.

 The central questions for the judges in Kiobel were whether or not:

1.    The ATS applied extra-territorially to foreign defendants operating outside the US.

2.    Corporations could be sued for violations of International Law.

The Court considered that the issue of paramount importance was the primary question and so re-heard the case based on this question alone.

In a unanimous decision, the court ruled that there was no definitive proof that the ATS was ever enacted to allow foreign claimants to sue foreign defendants in US courts for harms that occurred outside of the US. The decision of the judges was very much alive to the diplomatic burdens that it would place on the United States to allow harms occurring in other people’s countries to be brought before their Courts. For some, the ruling was a victory for US foreign relations but for others, particularly those who have pushed for the universal enforceability of human rights norms, the decision was a major setback which could ultimately provide carte blanche for corporations to continue to commit human rights violations abroad whilst providing no redress to victims.

After Kiobel

The Kiobel decision has had a dramatic impact on the ensuing success of the claims in the In Re Apartheid litigation. In August 2013 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case back down to the lower courts suggesting that the claims be dismissed in light of the Kiobel ruling. General Motors reached an earlier settlement with the plaintiffs, however, on 26 December 2013 the court of first instance held that, the claims against Daimler did not ‘touch and concern’ the US with sufficient force to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Kiobel and thus had to be dismissed. The claims against IBM and Ford, the two remaining plaintiffs, were however not dismissed. The court instead asked the parties to produce briefs on the question of whether corporations may be liable for breaches of International Law – which was the original, unanswered question in the Kiobel v Shell case. This leaves open the possibility for corporate liability for human rights violations abroad, however, whether or not other courts and perhaps ultimately the Supreme Court, will answer this question in the affirmative remains to be seen.